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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to investigate the possibility of incorporating interbank insurance among commercial banks. This is done by building upon the Diamond-Dybvig model.
We extend the Diamond-Dybvig model in three ways. First we abandon the single intermediary environment by introducing a banking sector that is made up of a continuum of banks
of mass 1; we assume that a small proportion (exogenously given) of banks experience runs.
Next, we suppose that all banks have access to and invest in interbank insurance. Lastly, it is
assumed that when banks withdraw illiquid funds prematurely they must pay a mandatory
transaction cost. In a banking system with liquidity shocks we show that, by designing an
optimal interbank insurance contract, the possibility of a bank becoming illiquid during a
bank run is zero.

Keywords: Interbank insurance, Liquidity shocks, Bank runs.
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Introduction
Financial crises have been widely discussed and documented by economists over the last

half-century. From the banking panics of 1930-31 to the 2008 financial crisis, we have learned
that history tends to repeat itself; we cannot rule out financial crises from happening. However, in recent years banking panics rarely occur.
It is important to understand the role of banks and why they are crucial to our economy.
A core function of banks is to create liquidity (Berger et al., 2015). That is, banks use
liquid liabilities to fund long-term illiquid assets (Bryant, 1980). Banks do this by offering
demand-deposit contracts which allow its customers to withdraw funds at any point in time
while providing them access to profitable long-term investments (Goldstein and Pauzner,
2005).
Liquidity creation plays a significant role in any economy (Berger et al., 2015). Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) showed that the level of utility achieved via demand-deposit contracts
offered by banks is unattainable under autarky. That is, agents can be made better off when
banks are introduced. However, when banks create liquidity they leave themselves exposed
to risks such as bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). A bank run is a situation where
all agents, concerned about a bank’s solvency, rush to the bank to withdraw funds; this may
cause a bank to run out of funds and be unable to serve all of its customers (Goldstein and
Pauzner, 2005).
Many different remedies for bank runs have been put in place so that banking panics do
not occur. For instance, suspension of convertibility can be applied so that agents lose incentive to run on the bank.1 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that if the number of agents
withdrawing are randomly distributed then suspension of convertibility does not eradicate
1

Suspension of convertibility works in the following way: those who want to withdraw early get what is
promised by the contract as long as the fraction of agents withdrawing early is below a certain threshold;
if this fraction is beyond that threshold then agents must wait until the next period to withdraw funds
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
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bank runs. It is shown that if the number of agents running on a bank is random, then
the best policy to implement is government deposit insurance; this will rule out panic based
bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).2
The model created by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) was used as the foundation for this
paper. It was shown, using the results obtained by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), existence
of multiple Nash equilibria when banks offer demand-deposit contracts. One Nash equilibrium is known as a “truth-telling” equilibrium. That is, if all agents tell the truth about
their types, and this is common knowledge, then they withdraw funds based on these types
and this constitutes a Nash equilibrium.3 Another equilibrium, that is known as a bank
run equilibrium, also arises. A bank run equilibrium occurs when agents believe banks will
become insolvent. Agents withdraw in the current period and even those who do not wish
to claim early consumption have incentive to run since they will be left with nothing if they
do not. That is, if agents wait until the next period then they get zero with certainty since
the bank would become insolvent.
The goal of this paper is not to find another way to eradicate bank runs but, instead, to
design a contract in which the possibility of banks becoming illiquid (during a bank run) is
zero. First we abandon the single intermediary environment by introducing a banking sector
that is represented by a large number of banks.4 Introducing a large number of banks opens
the door to linkages amongst banks. We assume that a mass 𝛼 of banks experience runs
while a mass 1 − 𝛼 of banks do not (banks do not know if their location will be hit with a
bank run, they just know that bank runs occur). The next extension we make is that banks

2

3

4

Government deposit insurance promises a fixed amount to those who withdraw early and is financed
by imposing taxes on impatient agents (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). These taxes are proportional to
agents’ wealth. A key assumption made by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is that the decision on how
much to tax may be decided after observing the number of agents withdrawing early.
There are two types of agents: impatient and patient. Impatient agents withdraw funds early while
patient agents withdraw funds late.
We assume that there is a continuum of banks of mass 1. Note that each bank serves a continuum of
agents of mass 1.
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put aside an amount for interbank insurance. All of these amounts are pooled and evenly
distributed among those banks experiencing runs. This insurance is put into place so that
banks that experience runs are able to cover all of its customers. Lastly we assume that
when banks liquidate assets (during a panic) they must pay a liquidation fee.5
The optimal interbank insurance contract is designed in the following way: with probability 𝛼 an agent is located at a bank that experiences runs, and with probability 1 − 𝛼 an
agent is located at a healthy bank. We want to choose the amount each banks pays into
interbank insurance such that all agents withdrawing early get what is promised by the contract whether they are located at a healthy bank or not. By construction we have designed
an optimal interbank insurance contract that rules out the possibility of banks, who opt for
this insurance, becoming illiquid during a bank run. Again, we are not in pursuit to find
a remedy that rules out bank runs completely; instead we use interbank insurance so that
banks do not default in times of crisis.
Much like how deposit insurance leads banks into investing in speculative projects, interbank insurance could potentially have this same effect on banks. That is, since banks
cannot become illiquid under the optimal interbank insurance contract (no matter the state
they are in) this could lead to banks engaging in activities that could have a negative impact
on the economy. To ensure this does not happen, a regulator is introduced in the model.
The role of the regulator is to watch over all banking activities within the banking system
(Cooper and Ross, 2002).
We suppose that the regulator imposes a restriction on the banks’ ability to offer agents
the same amount of funds when experiencing a crisis and when they are not. That is, the
amount a bank experiencing a run offers its customers6 is equal to a proportion of what

5

6

Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assume that banks can prematurely withdraw the illiquid technology at
no cost.
Note here that agents receive the same amount during a crisis, no matter their type since they all rush
to withdraw funds early.

3

healthy banks may offer its impatient customers. We show, through a numerical example,
that it is socially optimal for agents who are located at banks that experience runs to earn
the same amount as impatient agents do at healthy banks.

2

Literature Review
There has been a considerable amount of research done in the past four decades that

has helped us understand bank runs. Bryant (1980) along with Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
were among the first economists to show how bank runs occur and what can be done to
eradicate them. For instance, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed that a panic (about a
bank’s solvency) arises among depositors when a bank mixes its liquid liabilities with illiquid
assets. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed the existence of multiple equilibria: an equilibrium where all agents get what is desired and another where all depositors withdraw early
and cause the bank to become illiquid. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed that through
the use of government deposit insurance bank runs can be ruled out completely.
The vast majority of the literature on bank runs was built upon the work done by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Cooper and Ross (2002), who used an extension of the DiamondDybvig model, show that full deposit insurance can lead to a moral hazard problem where
intermediaries invest in speculative projects and the first-best contract cannot be achieved.
It is shown that after imposing an additional capital requirement on banks the first-best
contract is obtained (Cooper and Ross, 2002).
Allen and Gale (2000) extend the Diamond-Dybvig model by replacing the single intermediary environment with four identical banking regions; their goal was to investigate
the possibility of financial contagion when banks are interlinked. These four regions are
interlinked in the sense that banks hold claims on other banks to provide insurance when
they experience liquidity shocks (Allen and Gale, 2000). Each region is represented by a

4

single bank and it is shown that if one bank experiences a bank run then this will become
contagious and spread into the other regions if the banking system is not complete; however,
if the structure is complete the banking system might survive (Allen and Gale, 2000).
Investigating the possibility of systemic bank runs has been widely studied and discussed
ever since the 2008 financial crisis. Uhlig (2010) considers a three period model in which there
are a fixed number of core banks, a continuum of local banks of mass 1, and a continuum
of agents of mass 1. The interesting difference in this paper compared to others previously
mentioned is that the local banks run on the core banks rather than having agents run on
local banks (Uhlig, 2010). Core banks invest in asset backed securities (ABS) which are sold
to outside investors (Uhlig, 2010).7 It is shown that under the case of adverse selection the
probability of a systemic bank run occurring is low; under the assumption of uncertainty
averse outside investors bank runs become systemic if the market share of core banks experiencing runs is too large (Uhlig, 2010).
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that bank runs are completely avoidable in the presence of government deposit insurance. Since commercial banks know that their depositors’
investments are safe, this could potentially lead to banks engaging in ‘shadow banking’ activities (Luck and Schempp, 2015). That is, a moral hazard problem could arise from the
use of deposit insurance. Luck and Schempp (2015) show that if commercial banks actively
engage in shadow banking activity (which is not backed by deposit insurance), then a run on
those banks susceptible to runs could become contagious and impact the commercial banks
if the size of the shadow banking sector is large. A key result provided by Luck and Schempp
(2015), in the context of commercial banking, is that if a proportion of the commercial banks
are susceptible to runs (given that the commercial banks are interlinked) and the size of this

7

Uhlig (2010) investigates two different circumstances: the first case is when outside investors are uncertainty averse which means they follow certain rules to avoid uncertainty about the long term asset
they are purchasing; the second case is when investors do not know the quality of the term long asset
that is being sold to them (Uhlig, 2010).

5

proportion is beyond a certain threshold then the run can become systemic and even impact
those banks that are not susceptible to runs (Luck and Schempp, 2015).
One way that the Diamond-Dybvig model is extended in this paper is by relaxing the
assumption of having one unique bank that represents the entire banking system. That is,
the banking system is made up of many banks. This opens the door for interbank insurance
and trades. Brighi (2002) considers a static 3-period model where two banks make up the
entire banking system. Banks have an option to invest excess liquidity in the interbank
market (at a positive interest rate); it is shown that when banks have access to interbank
liquidity the probability that a bank becomes illiquid decreases and banks’ expected profits
increases (Brighi, 2002).

3

Model Outline
We will follow the model used in a seminal paper written by Diamond and Dybvig (1983),

also known as the Diamond-Dybvig model.8 Consider an economy that runs through three
periods, 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2. The model economy is populated with a continuum of agents of mass 1
and 1 commercial bank (This will be extended to a continuum of banks of mass 1 in Section
4.3).

Consumers
Agents are born in period 𝑡 = 0 and are endowed with one unit of a consumption good.
Upon birth, each agent is identical and does not know their own type; it is assumed that
there are two types of agents: impatient and patient. The proportion of agents that are impatient is denoted as 𝜋 while the proportion of patient agents is denoted as 1 − 𝜋. Impatient
8

Section 3 contains a description of the Diamond-Dybvig model; Sections 4.1-4.2 contain explanations
of some major results obtained by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Section 4.3 is where we generalize the
Diamond-Dybvig model.
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agents only care about consumption in period 𝑡 = 1 while patient agents only gain utility
from consumption in period 𝑡 = 2.
Each agent has the option to hoard their endowment or deposit their endowment at a
bank.9 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that agents never choose to hoard their endowment
so we only consider the case where agents deposit their funds into a bank. Initially, agents
face uncertainty about their preferred date to withdraw funds. In period 1 each agent learns
their type (this is an agent’s private information); this can be viewed as a liquidity shock
(Luck and Schempp, 2015). After observing their own types, agents then decide if they want
to withdraw funds in period 1 or wait until period 2 to withdraw funds. It is assumed that
1 1−𝜂
𝑐 .
an agent’s utility function is of the form 𝑢(𝑐𝑡 ) =
1−𝜂 𝑡
Let 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 denote the amount received by an impatient and patient consumer, respectively. Then the consumption profile denoted as (𝑐1 , 𝑐2 ) induces the following expected
utility:
𝑈 (𝑐1 , 𝑐2 ) = 𝜋𝑢(𝑐1 ) + (1 − 𝜋)𝛽𝑢(𝑐2 ).

(1)

Equation (1) represents an agent’s expected utility at date 𝑡 = 0. Here 𝛽 is the discount
factor by which utility is discounted in period 2.

Commercial Banks
Commercial banks cannot observe the agents’ types. Each bank offers two types of technologies: storage and productive technologies. Storage yields no return on deposits. If the
agents invest in the productive technology they get 1 if they withdraw in period 𝑡 = 1 and
𝑅 > 1 if they withdraw in period 𝑡 = 2.
It is assumed that the agents do not have direct access to the productive technology so
they must deposit their funds into a commercial bank to gain access. The commercial bank9

If an agent decides not to deposit in a bank and hoard their endowment instead, then this is the agent’s
private information. For the purpose of this paper, we say that agents have an ‘outside’ option which
is just hoarding their endowment period to period.
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ing system works in the following way: agents deposit their endowments into a bank, then
the bank takes these deposits and leaves a fraction of them aside (for on-demand liquidity)
then invests the rest in the productive technology.

Technology

𝑡=0 𝑡=1 𝑡=2

Storage (withdrawal in 𝑡 = 1)

−1

1

0

Storage (withdrawal in 𝑡 = 2)

−1

0

1

Productive (withdrawal in 𝑡 = 1) −1

1

0

Productive (withdrawal in 𝑡 = 2) −1

0

R

Table 1: Description of the technologies offered by banks
Table 1 shows how the investment-return mechanism works. From a societal point of view
a little in storage with the rest in the productive technology is the best option. However,
agents cannot do this without banks; this is why banks are so important.

4

Financial Intermediation and Bank Runs
First we will establish the first best allocation by solving the social planner’s problem.

Then we will investigate how commercial banks can offer a contract to its depositors such
that the first best allocation is achieved.

4.1

The Social Planner’s Problem

Consider the case where there is a benevolent planner who knows the types of all agents.
Since all agents are identical upon birth we may consider the representative agent problem;
hence the planner solves the following problem:

8

[︃
max

(𝑐1 ,𝑐2 )∈R2+

1 1−𝜂
1 1−𝜂
𝑐1 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜋)
𝑐
𝜋
1−𝜂
1−𝜂 2

]︃
(2)

subject to
(1 − 𝜋𝑐1 )𝑅 = (1 − 𝜋)𝑐2

(3)

where (2) represents the agent’s expected utility and equation (3) is the planner’s resource
constraint.
The resource constraint states that the amount of resources available in period 2 must
be equal to the amount consumed in period 2. Impatient agents consume 𝑐1 in 𝑡 = 1 and
what remains is 1 − 𝜋𝑐1 ; this amount matures in period 2 and grows by a factor of 𝑅. So,
the amount of resources available in 𝑡 = 2 is (1 − 𝜋𝑐1 )𝑅. Since the proportion of patient
agents is equal to 1 − 𝜋 and each of whom consumes 𝑐2 , we have that the total amount of
consumption in 𝑡 = 2 is equal to (1 − 𝜋)𝑐2 . Note that the amount of endowment collected is
∫︁ 1
equal to
1 · 𝑑𝑖 = 1.
0

Assumption 1. 𝛽𝑅 > 1.

FB
Lemma 1 (First-best Allocation). The first-best allocation, denoted as (𝑐FB
1 , 𝑐2 ), is given by

(︃
FB
(𝑐FB
1 , 𝑐2 )

=

1

(𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅

𝑅

)︃

,
.
1
1
𝜋(𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅 + (1 − 𝜋) 𝜋(𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅 + (1 − 𝜋)

Proof. See Appendix A.

9

(4)

1

Assumption 2. (𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅 > 1.

The risk sharing between impatient and patient agents is given by the Euler equation
(FOC to the problem (2)-(3))
′

′

𝑅𝛽𝑢 (𝑐2 ) = 𝑢 (𝑐1 ).

(5)

′

Using the fact that 𝑢 (·) is decreasing in 𝑐𝑡 and combining equation (5) with Assumptions 1
FB
10
FB
Thus, (𝑐FB
and 2 we get that 1 < 𝑐FB
1 , 𝑐2 ) is a unique solution to (2).
1 < 𝑐2 < 𝑅.

4.2

Implementing The First-best Allocation

In this section we show that a bank can implement the first-best allocation by means
of optimal insurance contracts (OIC). These OIC’s are signed by agents in period 𝑡 = 0.
It offers 𝑐FB
to impatient agents who withdraw in period 1, and 𝑐FB
to patient agents who
1
2
withdraw in period 2. It is important to note that banks do not know the agents’ types. The
following proposition introduces the notion of truth-telling and how it is optimal for agents
to withdraw at appropriate dates based on their private information.

Proposition 1. Under the optimal insurance contract, there exists an equilibrium where
truth-telling is optimal for all agents. That is, the consumption profile in equilibrium is
FB
(𝑐*1 , 𝑐*2 ) = (𝑐FB
1 , 𝑐2 ).

Proof.
Clearly the consumption profile obtained under the OIC is feasible and it satisfies equation (5). Since impatient agents do not gain utility from period 𝑡 = 2 consumption, it is
obvious that impatient agents will never choose to withdraw funds in period 𝑡 = 2. Next,
10

1

1

1

Using Assumption 2 we get that (𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅(1−𝜋) > (1−𝜋). This implies that (𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅 > 𝜋(𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅+
′
(1 − 𝜋). Thus 𝑐FB
> 1. Using the fact that 𝑢 (·) is decreasing in 𝑐𝑡 and by combining Assumption 1
1
− 𝜂1
FB
with Equation (5) we get that 𝑐FB
𝑅𝜋 > 𝜋.
1 < 𝑐2 . Using Assumption 2 once more we get that (𝛽𝑅)
1
FB
FB
This implies that (𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅𝜋 + (1 − 𝜋) > 1 and 𝑐FB
<
𝑅.
Therefore
1
<
𝑐
<
𝑐
<
𝑅.
2
1
2

10

since 𝑐*1 < 𝑐*2 this implies that a patient agent has no incentive to claim consumption in
𝑡 = 1, provided that everyone is telling the truth. Further, patient agents claim period 𝑡 = 2
consumption only because they know that all patient agents are telling the truth and this is
common knowledge. Otherwise, patient agents’ behaviour might not be optimal. Therefore,
truth-telling constitutes an equilibrium.
Implementing the first-best contract through optimal insurance contracts allows optimal
risk sharing among agents; incentives are such that, in equilibrium, all agents reveal their
true types (Luck and Schempp, 2015). Although the first-best outcome is achieved via OICs,
another equilibrium outcome arises: this outcome is known as a ‘bank run’. In the context
of this paper, the situation where all agents claim consumption in period 𝑡 = 1 is called a
‘bank run’.

Proposition 2. Under the optimal insurance contract, a ‘bank run’ is an equilibrium; an
1
agent gets 𝑐*1 with probability 𝑝 = * and zero with probability (1 − 𝑝).
𝑐1
Proof.
Suppose that a bank run occurs in period 𝑡 = 1. Then all agents attempt to withdraw
funds in period 1. The bank knows that it will eventually run out of liquid funds and needs
𝑐*1 to cover all withdrawing agents.11 However, not all agents who are withdrawing will receive the amount promised by the OIC. That is, since 1 unit was deposited in to the bank
in period 1 only 1 can be gotten. Hence the probability of an agent receiving the promised
1
1
amount during a bank run is equal to * and the probability of getting zero is 1 − * .12
𝑐1
𝑐1
1
Define 𝑝 = * .
𝑐1
11
12

∫︁
Note here that the bank needs

1

𝑐*1 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑐*1 to cover all agents.

0

Here we assume the cost of withdrawing the illiquid investment in period 1, 𝜏 , is zero. Otherwise, the
1 − 𝜏𝑖
probability an agent receives the promised amount in period 1 is given by
, where 𝑖 represent the
𝑐*1
amount a bank invests in the illiquid technology (Ennis and Keister, 2006).

11

It only suffices to show that no agent has incentive to deviate from withdrawing in period
1 when all others are claiming period 1 consumption. Since the bank will run out of funds
in period 1, those who do not run will receive zero with probability 1. On the other hand,
if an agent chooses to run they will receive 𝑐*1 with probability 𝑝 or zero with probability
(1 − 𝑝). Therefore, if everyone runs and claims early consumption, the best response to this
is to run.

4.3

Generalizing the Diamond-Dybvig Model

In this section we extend the Diamond-Dybvig model in three ways. First, we will
consider the case where there is a continuum of commercial banks of mass 1 that compete
for agents’ deposits. Further, suppose a bank run will occur with certainty and only a mass
𝛼 of banks are subject to runs while a mass 1−𝛼 are not.13 Second, we assume that all banks
place funds into interbank insurance, 𝑖1 , in period 𝑡 = 0; these funds are pooled together
and the insurance is only paid out to those banks experiencing runs. Lastly, we assume that
liquidating assets in 𝑡 = 1 comes at a cost. That is, when banks withdraw illiquid funds in
𝑡 = 1 they must pay a transaction cost, 𝜏 , on each unit invested in the illiquid technology
(𝑖2 ).14
Banks know that a run will occur with certainty but do not know whether a run will
13

14

Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show existence of multiple Nash equilibria: one outcome where all agents
get the promised amount offered in the deposit contract, and another outcome known as a bank run.
In this generalized model both outcomes are incorporated in designing the optimal contract. That is,
bank runs are assumed to happen where the probability that any of the mass 1 of banks face a run is
𝛼 (exogenously given). Since there is a continuum of banks of mass 1 this implies that only a fraction
𝛼 of banks face runs. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) address the issue of calculating the probability of
a run occurring at a bank in the Diamond-Dybvig environment.
In the Diamond-Dybvig model the bank, in times of crisis, liquidates assets at no cost. In this model
it is assumed that banks must pay a transaction cost when they liquidate assets; this is more realistic
because banks might not be able to costlessly liquidate assets. This opens the door to investigate
whether there exists some threshold for 𝜏 such that investing in the illiquid technology becomes too
costly in times of crisis and banks opt for holding more funds in storage (Ennis and Keister, 2006).
Diamond and Kashyap (2016) along with Ennis and Keister (2006) introduce a liquidation cost for the
illiquid technology in their respective models.
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occur at their location or not; the banks only know 𝛼 (exogenously given). If an agent is
located at a bank that does not experience runs then the amount of expected utility they
obtain is 𝜋𝑢(𝑐1,1 ) + 𝛽(1 − 𝜋)𝑢(𝑐2 ). On the other hand, if the agent is located at a bank that
is experiencing a run, the agent earns 𝑝𝑢(𝑐1,2 ) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢(0)15 on average. Note that 𝑐1,1
denotes the amount an impatient agent receives at a healthy bank in 𝑡 = 1, and 𝑐1,2 is the
amount an agent receives in 𝑡 = 1 if they are located at a bank that experiences runs.
Agents do not know if their bank is affected but know that runs occur with certainty. It
is assumed that 𝛼 is sufficiently small so that the amount each bank stores aside for safekeeping is relatively small. It is also assumed that when a bank experiences a bank run it
must liquidate assets in 𝑡 = 1 to attempt to meet the demand of agents withdrawing early.
This mandatory liquidation in times of crisis can be viewed as a form of regulation.
At time 𝑡 = 0, the probability of an agent being located at a bank which experiences runs
and receiving the promised amount in period 1 is 𝛼𝑝. If 𝑝 = 1, then all agents running at
the 𝛼-many banks will receive the promised amount in period 𝑡 = 1. If 𝑝 < 1, then the funds
raised from liquidating assets would not be sufficient to cover all withdrawing agents and
banks will become illiquid in 𝑡 = 1. We assume that 𝑝 < 1 but then, to meet the demand of
the agents withdrawing, all banks (including those experiencing runs) will choose an amount
to put into interbank insurance so that all agents earn what is promised by the contract.
The goal is to design an optimal interbank insurance contract. We want to construct
the contract in such a way that an agent located at a bank which experiences runs earns
the promised amount in period 1 with certainty. Interbank insurance works in the following
way: all banks put 𝑖1 into interbank insurance and a mass 𝛼 of banks receive these funds.
𝑖1
That is, the amount each of the 𝛼-many banks receives from this interbank insurance is .
𝛼
In 𝑡 = 0 the 𝛼-many banks each collect endowment of 1, invest in the long term asset, and

15

Note that 𝑝 and (1 − 𝑝) were stated in section 4.2; if a bank run happens and the agent withdraws in
period 1, then the agent receives 𝑐1 with probability 𝑝 and 0 with probability (1 − 𝑝).

13

put aside an amount for interbank insurance. In 𝑡 = 1 a bank run occurs and the 𝛼-many
banks need to liquidate assets which comes at a cost 𝜏 . A bank that experiences a run in
𝑖1
at their disposal.16 The probability an agent located at one of
𝑡 = 1 has 1 − 𝑖1 − 𝜏 𝑖2 +
𝛼
𝑖1
1 − 𝑖1 − 𝜏 𝑖2 +
𝛼 . We want to
the 𝛼-many banks gets the promised amount in 𝑡 = 1 is 𝑝 =
𝑐1,2
choose 𝑖1 such that 𝑝 = 1. In addition to choosing 𝑖1 , we also consider the case where agents
withdrawing in 𝑡 = 1 get the same amount at any bank. That is, we impose the condition
where 𝑐1,1 = 𝑐1,2 . Note that this can be generalized to the case where 𝑐1,2 = 𝛾𝑐1,1 , where 𝛾
is the rate set by a bank regulator.
Now we write the social planner’s problem to the generalized model:
[︃

]︃
[︃
]︃
1 1−𝜂
1 1−𝜂
1 1−𝜂
+𝛼
(1 − 𝛼) 𝜋
𝑐
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋)
𝑐
𝑐
max
1 − 𝜂 1,1
1−𝜂 2
1 − 𝜂 1,2
{𝑐1,1 ,𝑐1,2 ,𝑐2 ,𝑖1 ,𝑖2 }∈R5+

(6)

subject to
𝜋𝑐1,1 = 1 − 𝑖1 − 𝑖2

(7)

(1 − 𝜋)𝑐2 = 𝑖2 𝑅

(8)

𝑐1,2 = 1 − 𝑖1 − 𝜏 𝑖2 +

𝑖1
𝛼

(9)

𝑐1,1 = 𝑐1,2

(10)

Equations (6)-(10) represent the social planner’s problem to the generalized model.17 Equations (7)-(9) are the social planner’s resource constraints. Equation (10) ensures that agents
who run on the mass 𝛼 of banks earn the same as impatient agents located at healthy banks.
16

17

Note that the banks invest 𝑖2 and put aside 𝑖1 in 𝑡 = 0 then, because of the bank run, they are forced
𝑖1
to pull out the long-term investment (which comes at a cost of 𝜏 ) and receive
from the interbank
𝛼
𝑖1
𝑖1
= 1 − 𝑖1 − 𝜏 𝑖 2 + .
insurance. Thus we get 1 − 𝑖1 − 𝑖2 + (1 − 𝜏 )𝑖2 +
𝛼
𝛼
The social planner has control over all resources. Both sides of equations (7) and (8) are multiplied by
an “invisible” (1 − 𝛼). These terms cancel each other and we are left with what is shown in equations
(7) and (8). Similarly for equation (9), there is an “invisible” 𝛼 that is multiplied on both sides of the
equation.
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Equation (7) tells us that the amount received by impatient agents at healthy banks is
equal to what is left after subtracting the investment in the illiquid technology and interbank
insurance from the collected deposits. Note here that the amount chosen to be put aside for
interbank insurance, 𝑖1 , is used to help bail out the banks experiencing runs. Equation (8)
says that the amount given to patient agents at healthy banks is equal to the return on the
investment of the production technology.
Equation (9) represents the condition that all agents withdrawing early get the promised
amount in 𝑡 = 1. Cooper and Ross (2002) along with Ennis and Keister (2006) use a
variation of Equations (6)-(9) in their studies; they split their models into two cases: if
𝑝 = 1 then all agents running on a bank will get the promised amount, and if 𝑝 < 1 then
the bank will be unable to meet the demand for early withdrawals and thus become illiquid.18

Assumption 3.

1−𝛼
𝛽𝑅 > 1.
1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏

Lemma 2 (Optimal Interbank Insurance Contract). Given the problem shown in
equations (6)-(10), the optimal consumption profile is given by
1

𝑐**
1,1

=

𝑐**
2 =

𝜑(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅
1

[𝜑(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅(𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋) + (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )]
𝑅
− 𝜂1

[𝜑(𝑅𝛽)

,

(11)

,

(12)

𝑅(𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋) + (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )]

and
**
𝑐**
1,2 = 𝑐1,1 ,
18

(13)

The models used by Cooper and Ross (2002) and Ennis and Keister (2006) differ from the extended
model shown in this paper in a number of ways. Here we consider a continuum of banks of mass 1, incorporate an interbank insurance scheme, impose the condition that agents located at banks experiencing
runs receive the same as impatient agents do at healthy banks, and force 𝑝 to be 1.

15

[︃

1−𝛼
where 𝜑 =
1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝜏 )

]︃− 𝜂1
.

Proof. See Appendix B.
1

𝜑(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅(1 − 𝛼)
Assumption 4.
> 1.
1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏
The Euler equation for the problem shown in (6)-(10) is given by
′

𝑢 (𝑐1,1 ) =

1−𝛼
′
𝛽𝑅𝑢 (𝑐2 ).
1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝜏 )

(14)

1

That is, the solution lies on the ray 𝑐1,1 = 𝜑(𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑐2 . From Assumptions 3 and 4 we get
19
**
that 1 < 𝑐**
1,1 < 𝑐2 < 𝑅.

As mentioned before, all banks pay into this interbank insurance and if a bank happens to
experience a run then they receive insurance which is strictly used to help pay off all agents
running on the bank. According to the contract given in Lemma 2, impatient and patient
**
agents located at healthy banks receive 𝑐**
1,1 and 𝑐2 , respectively. On the other hand, agents
20
By
located at banks which experience runs receive 𝑐**
1,2 , no matter what type they are.

construction, the optimal interbank insurance contract eliminates the possibility of a bank
becoming illiquid during a bank run.

19
20

See Appendix B for this derivation.
Recall (from Proposition 2) that if everyone else runs and withdraws in 𝑡 = 1, then it is a best response
for an agent to run. Hence both types of agents located at the mass 𝛼 of banks will receive 𝑐**
1,2 .
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5

Interbank Insurance Contracts Under Regulation

5.1

Bank Regulation

To enrich the model a regulator, who watches over all banking activities, is introduced.
Suppose that the regulator imposes the following restriction:

𝑐1,2 = 𝛾𝑐1,1 , 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1.

(15)

That is, the mass 𝛼 of banks experiencing runs are only able to offer agents withdrawing in
𝑡 = 1 a proportion of what healthy banks do in period 𝑡 = 1. A reason for this might be that
if banks know they can provide the same to agents who withdraw in 𝑡 = 1 no matter the
state they are in and never become illiquid, then banks might take on more risky projects.
This regulation could be seen as a way to keep banks “in check”.
Equation (15) changes the constraint given in Equation (10). The problem in equations
(6)-(10) then becomes:
]︃
[︃
]︃
1 1−𝜂
1 1−𝜂
1 1−𝜂
𝑐
𝑐
+𝛼
𝑐
(1 − 𝛼) 𝜋
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋)
max
1 − 𝜂 1,1
1−𝜂 2
1 − 𝜂 1,2
{𝑐1,1 ,𝑐1,2 ,𝑐2 ,𝑖1 ,𝑖2 }∈R5+
[︃

(16)

subject to
𝜋𝑐1,1 = 1 − 𝑖1 − 𝑖2

(17)

(1 − 𝜋)𝑐2 = 𝑖2 𝑅

(18)

𝑐1,2 = 1 − 𝑖1 − 𝜏 𝑖2 +

𝑖1
𝛼

(19)

𝑐1,2 = 𝛾𝑐1,1

(20)

where 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1].
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Assumption 5.

(1 − 𝛼)[𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛾]
𝛽𝑅 > 1.
[𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛾 1−𝜂 ](1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )

Lemma 3. In the presence of banking regulation, the optimal consumption profile is given by
1

𝑐***
1,1

=

𝑐***
=
2

𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅
1

[𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅(𝛼𝛾 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋) + (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )]
𝑅
[𝜓(𝑅𝛽)

− 𝜂1

,

(21)

,

(22)

𝑅(𝛼𝛾 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋) + (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )]

and

***
𝑐***
1,2 = 𝛾𝑐1,1 ,

[︃

(1 − 𝛼)[𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛾]
where 𝜓 =
[(1 − 𝛼)𝜋 + 𝛼𝛾 1−𝜂 ][1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝜏 )]

(23)

]︃− 𝜂1
.

Proof. See Appendix B.

1

𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅(1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜋 + 𝛼𝛾)
Assumption 6.
> 1.
(1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )
′

From Assumptions 5 and 6, along with the fact that 𝑢 (·) is decreasing in 𝑐𝑡 , we can conclude
***
that 1 < 𝑐***
< 𝑅.21
1,1 < 𝑐2

21

See Appendix B for this derivation.
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5.2

Socially Optimal Level of Regulation

Introducing banking regulation opens the door to investigating which policy is socially
optimal. That is, we are looking to find the value of 𝛾 that maximizes the representative
agent’s expected utility (shown in equation (16)). From Lemma 3 we obtain the optimal
***
***
consumption profile ((𝑐***
1,1 , 𝑐2 ), 𝑐1,2 ), each of which are a function of 𝛾. When we combine

equations (21), (22), and (23) with equation (16) we get the following expected utility as a
function of 𝛾, denoted as 𝐸𝑈 * (𝛾) :
[︃

]︃
[︃
]︃
1
𝐸𝑈 * (𝛾) = (1 − 𝛼) 𝜋𝑢(𝑐1,1 (𝛾)*** ) + 𝛽(1 − 𝜋)
𝑢(𝑐2 (𝛾)*** ) + 𝛼 𝑢(𝑐1,2 (𝛾)*** ) .
1−𝜂

(24)

The social planner’s problems is to choose 𝛾 * ∈ [0, 1] so that social welfare is maximized.
That is, the social planner’s problem is:

max 𝐸𝑈 * (𝛾).

0≤𝛾≤1

(25)

Given the complexity of the expected utility function shown in Equation (24) we will solve
the maximization problem shown in (25) numerically. From our assumptions we have that
the proportion of banks that experience runs is relatively low. We choose 𝛼 = 0.02. Next
we choose 𝛽 = 0.9 and 𝑅 = 1.2 (Assumption 1 is satisfied). Next we chose the transaction
cost of withdrawing the productive investment in 𝑡 = 1 to be 𝜏 = 0.1. Suppose that the
proportion of impatient and patient agents are equal. The relative risk aversion parameter
is chosen to be 𝜂 = 0.5. All of these parameters are chosen so that Assumptions 1 through
6 hold.
Now we take the derivative of Equation (24) with respect to 𝛾:
***
***
***
𝜕𝑢(𝑐***
𝜕𝑢(𝑐***
𝜕𝐸𝑈 * (𝛾)
𝜕𝑢(𝑐***
1,1 ) 𝜕𝑐1,1
1,2 ) 𝜕𝑐1,2
2 ) 𝜕𝑐2
= (1 − 𝛼)𝜋
+
𝛽(1
−
𝛼)(1
−
𝜋)
+
𝛼
. (26)
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝑐***
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝑐***
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝑐***
𝜕𝛾
1,1
2
1,2
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Once we plug the aforementioned parameter values into Equation (26) it turns out that
𝐸𝑈 * (𝛾) is an increasing function on the interval [0, 1]. Since 𝐸𝑈 * (𝛾) is continuous ∀𝛾 ∈ [0, 1],
by the extreme value theorem, the function has a maximum and a minimum on the interval
[0, 1]. Further, since 𝐸𝑈 * is increasing on [0, 1], the maximum is obtained when 𝛾 = 1. That
is, 𝛾 * = 1 is the solution to the problem showed in (25) when 𝛼 = 0.02, 𝜋 = 0.5, 𝛽 = 0.90,
𝑅 = 1.2, 𝜂 = 0.5, and 𝜏 = 0.1.
When we plug 𝛾 * = 1 into Equations (21), (22), and (23), we get 𝑐***
1,1 = 1.01491,
*
𝑐***
= 1.17897 , 𝑐***
2
1,2 = 1.01491, respectively. This yields an expected utility of 𝐸𝑈 (1) =

1.98525.

Figure 1: Welfare function for all values of 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 1 shows the expected utility function, as seen in Equation (24), for values of 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1].
The function is increasing on the interval [0, 1] and the maximum is achieved when 𝛾 * = 1.
Therefore, in the context of this numerical example, the social planner chooses 𝛾 * = 1 so that
social welfare is optimized. The intuition behind 𝛾 * = 1 can be explained in the following
way: since, in this model, banks do not take on an excessively risky investment this implies
that the introduction of regulation makes agents worse off.

20

6

Conclusions
In this paper we start out with the Diamond-Dybvig model in which the banking sector

is represented by a single bank. There is an equilibrium where all agents tell the truth about
their types and withdraw accordingly, and there exists a second equilibrium known as a bank
run; in the context of this paper, a bank run is the situation where all agents, motivated by
fear of a bank becoming insolvent, withdraw funds and claim consumption in period 1. The
bank, even after liquidating assets, might not be able to meet the demand of all withdrawing
agents thus becoming illiquid in period 1. A bank run is considered to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy (Allen and Gale, 2000).
We generalize the Diamond-Dybvig model in three ways. The first extension is that now
we assume the banking sector is represented by a continuum of banks of mass 1 where a
mass 𝛼 of banks are subject to a bank run while a mass 1 − 𝛼 of banks are not. We do
not try to eliminate the possibility of a bank run occurring, instead we assume that a bank
run occurs with certainty but only a small proportion of banks are affected. Second, we
assume each bank puts aside an amount into interbank insurance; all of the funds placed
into interbank insurance are pooled together and evenly distributed among those banks
experiencing runs. Lastly, we assume banks experiencing runs must liquidate assets in 𝑡 = 1
and pay a mandatory liquidation fee per unit invested in the productive technology.
In this model of bank runs an optimal interbank insurance contract was designed in
which all agents get the promised amount in 𝑡 = 1, even during a bank run. The contract,
by construction, also rules out the possibility of banks becoming illiquid when a bank run
occurs. To enhance the model a banking regulator was introduced. A banking regulator’s
objective is to watch over all banking operations to ensure that all banks are operating within
the rules and regulations (Cooper and Ross, 2002). We suppose that this regulator imposes
a restriction on banks experiencing bank runs in an attempt to stop banks from investing

21

in speculative projects. That is, if a bank experiences a run then it cannot offer agents
withdrawing in 𝑡 = 1 the same amount as healthy banks do in 𝑡 = 1. It was shown, through
a numerical example, that the socially optimal level of regulation was such that healthy
banks and those banks experiencing runs offer the same amount to agents who withdraw in
𝑡 = 1.
In the future it would be interesting to investigate the possibility of turning this model into
one of shadow banking and systemic bank runs. That is, if some banks perform regulatory
arbitrage then they would find themselves outside of the perimeter of regulation which could
lead to a moral hazard problem and an emergence of a shadow banking sector (Luck and
Schempp, 2015). It would be interesting to see if the size of the shadow banking sector plays
a role in determining whether or not bank runs can become contagious.
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Appendix A

Proof of Lemma 1

We have the following problem:
[︃
max

(𝑐1 ,𝑐2 )∈R2+

1 1−𝜂
1 1−𝜂
𝜋
𝑐1 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜋)
𝑐
1−𝜂
1−𝜂 2

]︃
(27)

subject to
(1 − 𝜋𝑐1 )𝑅 = (1 − 𝜋)𝑐2 .

(28)

We will solve this problem using the Lagrangian Multiplier Method. We write the Lagrangian
and first-order conditions:
]︃
[︁
]︁
1 1−𝜂
1 1−𝜂
𝑐
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋)
𝑐
− 𝜆 (1 − 𝜋𝑐1 )𝑅 − (1 − 𝜋)𝑐2
ℒ= 𝜋
1−𝜂 1
1−𝜂 2
[︃

(29)

𝜕ℒ
=0:
𝜕𝑐1

𝜋𝑐−𝜂
1 + 𝜆𝜋𝑅 = 0

(30)

𝜕ℒ
=0:
𝜕𝑐2

𝛽(1 − 𝜋)𝑐−𝜂
2 + (1 − 𝜋)𝜆 = 0

(31)

𝜕ℒ
=0:
𝜕𝜆

(1 − 𝜋𝑐1 )𝑅 − (1 − 𝜋)𝑐2 = 0.

(32)

Combining Equations (30) and (31) gives us the following Euler equation:
−𝜂
𝑐−𝜂
1 = 𝑅𝛽𝑐2 .

(33)

Simplifying Equation (33) yields
1

𝑐1 = (𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑐2 .
23

(34)

Combining Equation (32) and (34) gives us
1

(1 − 𝜋(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑐2 )𝑅 = (1 − 𝜋)𝑐2 .

(35)

Simplifying Equation (35) and rearranging for 𝑐2 yields
𝑐𝐹2 𝐵 =

𝑅
𝜋(𝛽𝑅)

− 𝜂1

.

(36)

𝑅 + (1 − 𝜋)

If we plug Equation (36) into Equation (34) we get our value for 𝑐𝐹1 𝐵 . That is,
1

𝑐𝐹1 𝐵

=

(𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅
1

𝜋(𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅 + (1 − 𝜋)

.

(37)

Therefore, the first-best allocation is given by
(︃
FB
(𝑐FB
1 , 𝑐2 ) =

1

(𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅

𝑅

)︃

,
.
1
1
𝜋(𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅 + (1 − 𝜋) 𝜋(𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅 + (1 − 𝜋)

FB
Note that 1 < 𝑐FB
1 < 𝑐2 < 𝑅.
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(38)

Appendix B

Proof of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3

First we prove Lemma 3. Lemma 2 follows immediately after since it is a special case of
Lemma 3. So the problem is written as follows:
[︃

]︃
[︃
]︃
1 1−𝜂
1 1−𝜂
1 1−𝜂
max
(1 − 𝛼) 𝜋
𝑐
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝜋)
𝑐
+𝛼
𝑐
1 − 𝜂 1,1
1−𝜂 2
1 − 𝜂 1,2
{𝑐1,1 ,𝑐1,2 ,𝑐2 ,𝑖1 ,𝑖2 }∈R5+

(39)

subject to
𝜋𝑐1,1 = 1 − 𝑖1 − 𝑖2

(40)

(1 − 𝜋)𝑐2 = 𝑖2 𝑅

(41)

𝑐1,2 = 1 − 𝑖1 − 𝜏 𝑖2 +

𝑖1
𝛼

(42)

𝑐1,2 = 𝛾𝑐1,1 .

(43)

First we write the Lagrangian and first-order conditions (note that we plug Equation (43)
into Equations (39) and (42) from the start to reduce the dimensionality of the problem):
[︃

]︃
[︃
]︃
1 1−𝜂
1 1−𝜂
1
1−𝜂
ℒ = (1 − 𝛼) 𝜋
𝑐1,1 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜋)
𝑐2
+𝛼
𝛾 1−𝜂 𝑐1,1
1−𝜂
1−𝜂
1−𝜂
[︁
[︁
]︁
]︁
[︁
𝑖1 ]︁
(44)
− 𝜆1 𝜋𝑐1,1 − 1 + 𝑖1 + 𝑖2 − 𝜆2 (1 − 𝜋)𝑐2 − 𝑖2 𝑅 − 𝜆3 𝛾𝑐1,1 − 1 + 𝑖1 + 𝜏 𝑖2 −
𝛼

𝜕ℒ
=0:
𝜕𝑐1,1

1−𝜂 −𝜂
(1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝑐−𝜂
𝑐1,1 − 𝜆1 𝜋 − 𝜆3 𝛾 = 0
1,1 + 𝛼𝛾

𝜕ℒ
=0:
𝜕𝑐2

(1 − 𝛼)𝛽(1 − 𝜋)𝑐−𝜂
2 − (1 − 𝜋)𝜆2 = 0

𝜕ℒ
=0:
𝜕𝑖1

−𝜆1 + 𝜆3

(︁ 1 − 𝛼 )︁
𝛼
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=0

(45)

(46)

(47)

𝜕ℒ
=0:
𝜕𝑖2

−𝜆1 + 𝜆2 𝑅 − 𝜆3 𝜏 = 0

(48)

𝜕ℒ
=0:
𝜕𝜆1

𝜋𝑐1,1 − 1 + 𝑖1 + 𝑖2 = 0

(49)

𝜕ℒ
=0:
𝜕𝜆2

(1 − 𝜋)𝑐2 − 𝑖2 𝑅 = 0

(50)

𝜕ℒ
=0:
𝜕𝜆3

𝛾𝑐1,1 − 1 + 𝑖1 + 𝜏 𝑖2 −

𝑖1
= 0.
𝛼

(51)

Rearranging Equation (46) gives us
𝜆2 = (1 − 𝛼)𝛽𝑐−𝜂
2 .

(52)

Similarly, we rearrange Equation (47) to isolate for 𝜆1 :

𝜆1 = 𝜆3

(︁ 1 − 𝛼 )︁
𝛼

.

(53)

If we combine Equation (48) with Equation (53) we get

𝜆3 =

𝛼𝑅
𝜆2 .
1 − 𝛼 + 𝜏𝛼

(54)

Now plug Equation (45) into Equation (53) and simplify to get
1−𝜂 −𝜂
(1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝑐−𝜂
𝑐1,1 = 𝜆3
1,1 + 𝛼𝛾

26

[︁ 𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛾 ]︁
.
𝛼

(55)

Combining Equations (52) and (54) with Equation (55) yields

𝑐−𝜂
1,1

[︁

(1 − 𝛼)𝜋 + 𝛼𝛾

1−𝜂

]︁

[︃

]︃
𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛾 −𝜂
= (1 − 𝛼)𝑅𝛽
𝑐2 .
1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏

(56)

Rearranging Equation (56) gives us the following Euler equation:
[︃

𝑐−𝜂
1,1

]︃
(1 − 𝛼)[𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛾]
=
𝑅𝛽𝑐−𝜂
2 .
[(1 − 𝛼)𝜋 + 𝛼𝛾 1−𝜂 ][1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 ]

Raising both sides of Equation (57) to the power −

(57)

1
yields
𝜂

1

𝑐1,1 = 𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑐2 .
[︃

(1 − 𝛼)[𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛾]
Note that 𝜓 =
[(1 − 𝛼)𝜋 + 𝛼𝛾 1−𝜂 ][1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 ]

(58)

]︃− 𝜂1
.

Now we combine Equations (49)-(51) and rearrange to get
[︁
]︁
[︁
]︁
𝑐1,1 (1 − 𝛼)𝜋 + 𝛼𝛾 𝑅 = 𝑅 − 𝑐2 𝛼𝜏 (1 − 𝜋) + (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼) .

(59)

If we plug Equation (58) into Equation (59) then isolate for 𝑐2 we get the equilibrium level
of 𝑐2 . That is,
𝑐***
=
2

𝑅
[𝜓(𝑅𝛽)

− 𝜂1

.

(60)

𝑅(𝛼𝛾 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋) + (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )]

Then we use the expression for 𝑐***
along with Equation (58) to solve for the equilibrium
2
level of 𝑐1,1 and 𝑐1,2 . That is,
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1

𝑐***
1,1

=

𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅
1

[𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅(𝛼𝛾 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋) + (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )]

,

(61)

and
***
𝑐***
1,2 = 𝛾𝑐1,1 .

(62)

Now we use the optimal consumption plan and the constraints to solve for the optimal
***
investment (𝑖***
2 ) and the optimal amount placed in interbank insurance (𝑖1 ). We get that

𝑖***
= 1 − 𝜋𝑐***
1
1,1 −

(1 − 𝜋) ***
𝑐2
𝑅

and

𝑖***
=
2

(1 − 𝜋) ***
𝑐2 .
𝑅

(63)

Therefore, the optimal consumption profile is given by
1

𝑐***
1,1

=

𝑐***
=
2

𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅
1

[𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅(𝛼𝛾 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋) + (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )]
𝑅
[𝜓(𝑅𝛽)

− 𝜂1

,

(64)

,

(65)

𝑅(𝛼𝛾 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋) + (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )]
and
***
𝑐***
1,2 = 𝛾𝑐1,1 .

(66)

***
Now we show that 1 < 𝑐***
< 𝑅.22 From Assumption 6 we have that
1,1 < 𝑐2
1

(1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜋 + 𝛼𝛾)𝜓(𝛽𝑅)− 𝜂 𝑅 > (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 ). This implies that 𝑐***
1,1 > 1. Next,
′

using Assumption 5 and Equation (57) together with the fact that 𝑢 (·) is decreasing in 𝑐𝑡 ,
′

′

***
***
***
we can conclude that 𝑢 (𝑐***
1,1 ) > 𝑢 (𝑐2 ). That is, 𝑐1,1 < 𝑐2 .
1

Lastly, to show that 𝑐***
< 𝑅 it suffices to show that 𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅(𝛼𝛾 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋) + (1 −
2

22

Note that

⋃︀
(1 − 𝛼)[𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛾]
< 1 ∀𝛾 ∈ (0, 1] and ∀𝜂 ∈ (0, 1) (1, ∞).
1−𝜂
(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )[𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛾
]
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(1 − 𝛼)[𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛾]
< 1 ∀𝛾 ∈ (0, 1] and
𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 ) > 1. Using the fact that
(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )[𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛾 1−𝜂 ]
⋃︀
⋃︀
∀𝜂 ∈ (0, 1) (1, ∞) we can conclude that 𝜓 > 1 ∀𝛾 ∈ (0, 1] and ∀𝜂 ∈ (0, 1) (1, ∞). Further,
1

1

since (𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅 > 1 this implies that 𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅 > 1. Now by expanding and simplifying the
1

1

we get 𝛼𝛾𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅 + (1 − 𝜋) − 𝛼(1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝜏 ).
denominator of 𝑐***
2
1

Expanding and collecting like terms yields the following expression: 1 + 𝜋(𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅 − 1) +
1

𝛼(𝛾𝜓(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅 − (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝜏 )). For 𝛾 = 1 the expression is strictly greater than 1. For
𝛾 ∈ (0, 1) the expression is strictly greater than 1, provided that 𝛼 is sufficiently small (as
***
< 𝑅.
< 𝑅. Therefore, 1 < 𝑐***
assumed in Section 4.3). Thus we conclude that 𝑐***
1,1 < 𝑐2
2

We do not need to prove Lemma 2 in the way we proved Lemma 3. All that is needed
is to plug 𝛾 = 1 into the solution obtained in Lemma 3. When 𝛾 = 1 we get that
[︃
]︃− 𝜂1 [︃
]︃− 𝜂1
[︃
]︃− 𝜂1
(1 − 𝛼)[𝜋(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼 * 1]
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
𝜓=
=
. Put 𝜑 =
.
1−𝜂
[(1 − 𝛼)𝜋 + 𝛼 * 1 ][1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 ]
1 − 𝛼 + 𝜏𝛼
1 − 𝛼 + 𝜏𝛼
Then the solution to Lemma 2 is given by:
1

𝑐**
1,1
𝑐**
2

𝜑(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅

=

,
1
[𝜑(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅(𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋) + (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )]
𝑅
,
=
1
[𝜑(𝑅𝛽)− 𝜂 𝑅(𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜋) + (1 − 𝜋)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜏 )]

**
𝑐**
1,2 = 𝑐1,1 ,
**
𝑖**
1 = 1 − 𝜋𝑐1,1 −

(67)
(68)
(69)

(1 − 𝜋) **
𝑐2 ,
𝑅

(70)

and
𝑖**
2 =

(1 − 𝜋) **
𝑐2 .
𝑅

(71)

**
Note that 1 < 𝑐**
1,1 < 𝑐2 < 𝑅.
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Appendix C

Comparing the Extended Model to the
Diamond-Dybvig Model

In this section we consider a numerical example where we compare the extended model
shown in Equations (16)-(20) with the Diamond-Dybvig model. Suppose that 𝜋 = 0.4,
𝜂 = 0.9, 𝛽 = 0.9, 𝑅 = 1.2, 𝜏 = 0.2, and 𝛼 = 0.001 (all assumptions are satisfied). When we
combine the aforementioned parameter values with Equation (26) it turns out that 𝐸𝑈 * (𝛾)
is an increasing function ∀𝛾 ∈ [0, 1]. That is, social welfare is maximized when 𝛾 * = 1.

Figure C1: Welfare function for all values of 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1].

Figure C1 shows the expected utility function for all values of 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1]. The function is
increasing on the interval [0, 1] and the maximum is obtained when 𝛾 * = 1. It turns out that
***
***
𝑐***
= 1.15281; this yields an expected utility of 𝐸𝑈 * (1) = 9.50072.
1,1 = 𝑐1,2 = 1.05856, 𝑐2

Note that 𝑖***
= 0.00017 and 𝑖***
= 0.57640.
1
2
Now we compare the consumption and expected utility levels obtained in each model. In
order to do this we consider the two states of a bank: the first case is where a run does not
30

occur, and the second case is where a run occurs.
Case 1: No run occurs
In this case agents are located at a bank that does not face a bank run. The table below
shows the consumption and expected utility levels obtained in both models.

Extended Model

Diamond-Dybvig Model

Withdrawal in 𝑡 = 1 𝑐***
1,1 = 1.05856

= 1.05861
𝑐𝐷𝐷
1

= 1.15281
Withdrawal in 𝑡 = 2 𝑐***
2

= 1.15311
𝑐𝐷𝐷
2

Expected Utility

9.50033

9.50016

Table C1: Consumption and expected utility levels in both models in the case of no run.
From the results shown in Table C1 we can conclude that the levels of consumption and
expected utility are slightly higher in the Diamond-Dybvig model compared to the extended
model. Note that the expected utility (in the case that a run does not occur) is calculated
using Equation (1).
In the Diamond-Dybvig model the bank collects all deposits and invests it in the productive technology (𝑖𝐷𝐷
= 1). In the extended model a bank invests 𝑖***
= 0.57640 in the
2
2
productive technology. That is, in the extended model a bank decides to invest less in the
productive technology and keep more in storage.

Case 2: A run occurs
In this case agents are located at a bank that experiences a run. All agents decide to run
1
on the bank and in the Diamond-Dybvig model an agent receives 𝑐𝐷𝐷
with probability 𝐷𝐷
1
𝑐1
(︁
1 )︁
and 0 with probability 1 − 𝐷𝐷 . In the extended model agents receive 𝑐***
1,2 with certainty.
𝑐1
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Extended Model
Withdrawal in 𝑡 = 1 𝑐***
1,2 = 1.05856

Diamond-Dybvig Model
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨𝑐𝐷𝐷
= 1.05861 with probability 0.94463
1
⎪
⎪
⎩0

Withdrawal in 𝑡 = 2

0

0

Expected Utility

10.05707

9.50033

with probability 0.05537

Table C2: Consumption and expected utility levels in both models in the case of a run.
Table C2 displays the levels of consumption and expected utility obtained in the DiamondDybvig model and the extended model. During a run an agent receives 1.05861 with probability 0.94463 and zero with probability 0.05537 in the Diamond-Dybvig model. In the
extended model an agent receives 1.05856 with certainty. The consumption levels during
a run are higher on average in the extended model. In turn, the level of expected utility
obtained during a run is higher in the extended model compared to the Diamond-Dybvig
model. In order for banks in the extended model to stay liquid during a run, they must put
= 0.00017 in interbank insurance; this is a small price for banks to pay to
an amount of 𝑖***
1
stay liquid in times of crisis.
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